| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6176 |
| DP6176 The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm?s Valuation | |
| Massimo Motta; Gregor Langus | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-16 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint-liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or being of a similar culture) have higher repayment and higher savings. Furthermore, I observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate after default, and that through successful monitoring, individuals know who to punish and who not to punish after default. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Group lending Informal savings Microfinance Social capital |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6176 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535019 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Motta,Gregor Langus. DP6176 The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm?s Valuation. 2007. |
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