| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6201 |
| DP6201 A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 | |
| Paola Sapienza; Annette Vissing-Jørgensen; Yael Hochberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes how non-voting shares affect the takeover outcome in a single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benefit extraction. In equilibrium, the target firm's security-voting structure influences the bidder's participation constraint and in response the shareholders' conditional expectations about the post-takeover share value. Therefore, the structure can be chosen to discriminate among bidder types. Typically, the socially optimal structure deviates from one share - one vote to promote all and only value-increasing bids. As target shareholders ignore takeover costs, they prefer more takeovers and hence choose a smaller fraction of voting shares than is socially optimal. In either case, the optimal fraction of voting shares decreases with the quality of shareholder protection and increases with the incumbent manager's ability. Finally, shareholder returns are higher when a given takeover probability is implemented by (more) non-voting shares rather than by (larger) private benefits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Dual-class share structure Free-rider behaviour Tender offer |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6201 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535055 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paola Sapienza,Annette Vissing-Jørgensen,Yael Hochberg. DP6201 A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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