| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6224 |
| DP6224 Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications | |
| Jerome Pouyet; Johan Hombert; Nicolas Schutz | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment. Constant access tariffs cannot achieve the first best. Optimal time-variant access tariffs may be increasing or decreasing over time. The first-best cannot be achieved at all through access tariff regulation if the follower?s private incentives are dominated by business-stealing. Here access holidays can improve welfare by allowing for lower future access charges, which delay the second investment. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Access holidays Investments Preemption Time-variant access charges |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6224 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535059 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerome Pouyet,Johan Hombert,Nicolas Schutz. DP6224 Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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