| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6227 |
| DP6227 Evidence from Surveys of Price-Setting Managers: Policy Lessons and Directions for Ongoing Research | |
| Vitor Gaspar; Andrew Levin; Frank Smets; Fernando Manuel Martins | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There are situations in which more licenses are sold if effort is a hidden action. Moral hazard may thus increase the probability that the product will be developed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation Licences Monopoly Private information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6227 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535062 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vitor Gaspar,Andrew Levin,Frank Smets,et al. DP6227 Evidence from Surveys of Price-Setting Managers: Policy Lessons and Directions for Ongoing Research. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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