| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| 来源ID | DP6230
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| DP6230 Labour Market Adjustment, Social Spending and the Automatic Stabilizers in the OECD |
| Jacques MELITZ; Julia Darby
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-28
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes. In this paper we model that interaction in a framework of a perfectly competitive international TEP-market, where heterogeneous firms trade their TEP endowments. National governments set energy taxes non-cooperatively so as to maximize fiscal revenue from energy and profit taxes. We identify the driving forces behind Nash equilibrium taxes. We show how they depend on the total amount of TEPs in the market, on firms' TEP-endowment and on the number of participating countries. We also show how energy taxation varies with the introduction of the market on a previously unregulated world. Finally, we highlight the fact that the TEP-market does not achieve abatement cost efficiency, despite its being perfectly competitive. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
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| 关键词 | Fiscal competition
Kyoto protocol
Tradable permits
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6230
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535064
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jacques MELITZ,Julia Darby. DP6230 Labour Market Adjustment, Social Spending and the Automatic Stabilizers in the OECD. 2007.
|
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