| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6241 |
| DP6241 Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening | |
| Mike Burkart; Christian At; Samuel Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit. To ensure that there exists a computationally tractable Markov perfect equilibrium, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn, privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model. Our game of incomplete information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies. In contrast, the existence of an equilibrium in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of industry dynamics requires admissibility of mixed entry/exit strategies, contrary to the assertion in their paper, that existing algorithms cannot cope with. In addition, we provide a condition on the model's primitives that ensures that the equilibrium is in pure investment strategies. Building on this basic existence result, we first show that a symmetric equilibrium exists under appropriate assumptions on the model's primitives. Second, we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes degenerate, equilibria in cutoff entry/exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed entry/exit strategies of the game of complete information. Finally, we provide the first example of multiple symmetric equilibria in this literature. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic oligopoly Industry dynamics Markov perfect equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6241 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535067 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mike Burkart,Christian At,Samuel Lee. DP6241 Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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