| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6256
|
| DP6256 The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance |
| Luc Laeven; Vidhi Chhaochharia
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-16
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Having a female firstborn child significantly increases the probability that a woman?s first marriage breaks up. Recent work has exploited this exogenous variation to measure the effect of marital break-up on economic outcomes, and has concluded that divorce has little effect on women?s average household income. Employing an Abadie (2003) technique that allows us to look at the impact of marital break-up throughout the income distribution, however, we find that divorce greatly increases the probability that a woman lives in a household with income in the bottom quartile. While women partially offset the loss of spousal earnings with child support, welfare, combining households, and substantially increasing their labour supply, divorce significantly increases the odds that a woman with children is poor. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Divorce
Poverty
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6256
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535075
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Luc Laeven,Vidhi Chhaochharia. DP6256 The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance. 2007.
|
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