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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP6263 |
DP6263 Choosing the Legal Retirement Age in Presence of Unemployment | |
Georges Casamatta; Caroline De Paoli | |
发表日期 | 2007-04-23 |
出版年 | 2007 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate. We analyze different price schemes (uniform pricing, implicit price discrimination - or rebates, explicit price discrimination) and show that the schemes which - for given market structure - induce a higher level of welfare are also those under which the incumbent is more likely to exclude the rival. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Abuse of dominance Exclusionary practices Network industry Price discrimination Rebates |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6263 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535098 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georges Casamatta,Caroline De Paoli. DP6263 Choosing the Legal Retirement Age in Presence of Unemployment. 2007. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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