| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6268 |
| DP6268 Unlocking Value: Equity Carve outs as Strategic Real Options | |
| Enrico Perotti; Silvia Rossetto | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the present paper, we analyze an original channel of interaction between politicians and lobbies i.e. the nuisance power of a lobby. Some lobbies are influencing public policies just because they are able to impact negatively the image of a politician. More particularly, we develop a setting in which unions may transmit some information to the voters about the quality of the government via a costly signal i.e. a strike. In our setting unions represent sectors of the economy. An incumbent government seeking reelection allocates a fixed budget among several unionized sectors. Strikes are costly and transmit information to voters about the quality of the government. The politician may have interest to distort the budget allocation away from the efficient one in order to maximize his/her probability of reelection. In most cases a hostile receive receives more than a neutral/friendly one. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Lobby Political economy Strike |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6268 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535103 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico Perotti,Silvia Rossetto. DP6268 Unlocking Value: Equity Carve outs as Strategic Real Options. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
