| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6273 |
| DP6273 Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries | |
| Rohini Pande | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bargaining in legislatures Baron/ferejohn model Open rules Three-group and four-group equilibria |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6273 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535107 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rohini Pande. DP6273 Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries. 2007. |
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