G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6281
DP6281 Party Formation and Racism
Philippe De Donder; Vincent Anesi
发表日期2007-05-04
出版年2007
语种英语
摘要We develop a model where voters differ in their exogenous income and in their ideological views regarding what we call 'racism'. Electoral competition, modelled à la Levy (2004), takes place between (one or several) parties which propose platforms consisting of both an ideological and an economic dimension. Our objective is to explain the emergence of racist policies when a majority of voters is not racist, and to understand the role played by political parties in this emergence. We first show that, in a pure citizen-candidate model where parties are absent, the only equilibrium consists of the non-racist policy. We then show that allowing for the formation of political parties generates equilibria with racist policies. Finally, our main result states that, if the economic issue is sufficiently salient compared to the ideological one, all equilibria consist of a racist policy, and that the lowest degree of racism of these policies increases with the proportion of poor people in the economy.
主题Public Economics
关键词Electoral competition Polarization Political parties Salience
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6281
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535122
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Philippe De Donder,Vincent Anesi. DP6281 Party Formation and Racism. 2007.
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