| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6281 |
| DP6281 Party Formation and Racism | |
| Philippe De Donder; Vincent Anesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model where voters differ in their exogenous income and in their ideological views regarding what we call 'racism'. Electoral competition, modelled à la Levy (2004), takes place between (one or several) parties which propose platforms consisting of both an ideological and an economic dimension. Our objective is to explain the emergence of racist policies when a majority of voters is not racist, and to understand the role played by political parties in this emergence. We first show that, in a pure citizen-candidate model where parties are absent, the only equilibrium consists of the non-racist policy. We then show that allowing for the formation of political parties generates equilibria with racist policies. Finally, our main result states that, if the economic issue is sufficiently salient compared to the ideological one, all equilibria consist of a racist policy, and that the lowest degree of racism of these policies increases with the proportion of poor people in the economy. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Electoral competition Polarization Political parties Salience |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6281 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535122 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe De Donder,Vincent Anesi. DP6281 Party Formation and Racism. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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