| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6298
|
| DP6298 Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War |
| Benjamin Jones; Benjamin Olken
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-05-11
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients; high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of regulated monopolies, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to regulated monopolies only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Competition
Hospitals
Waiting times
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6298
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535131
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Benjamin Jones,Benjamin Olken. DP6298 Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War. 2007.
|
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