| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6311 |
| DP6311 Welfare Effects of Financial Integration | |
| Philipp Hartmann; Falko Fecht; Hans Peter Grüner | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Treating control as an asset that can be bought and sold, we introduce a model of the simultaneous and separable trading of ownership and control in a private information setting. The model provides a novel explanation for the prevalence and persistence of the separation of ownership from control in modern corporations: efficiency in the market for corporate control is more easily achieved when ownership is not concentrated in the hands of the manager. The central reason is that low managerial ownership reduces informational rents in the market for control. Using a mechanism design approach, we fully characterize the optimal mechanism for restructuring ownership and control. Under the optimal mechanism, corporations typically increase the number of shares of the incumbent manager if he remains in control, and give him a generous golden parachute that includes both stock and cash if he is deposed. By contrast, combining ownership and control is optimal only if agency costs are extreme. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate control Mechanism design Ownership Restructuring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6311 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535144 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philipp Hartmann,Falko Fecht,Hans Peter Grüner. DP6311 Welfare Effects of Financial Integration. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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