全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6319 Fire-sale FDI

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6319
	DP6319 Fire-sale FDI
	Hyun Song Shin; Viral Acharya; Tanju Yorulmazer
发表日期	2007-05-25
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	A particular tariff option is said to be foggy when another option or a combination of other tariff options offered by the same firm is always less expensive regardless of the usage profile of any customer. Alternatively, tariff fogginess may refer to the whole set of tariff options and it is related to the low likelihood that a particular tariff option ends up being the least expensive one among those of a menu of tariff plans for an arbitrary distribution of usage patterns. This paper takes advantage of the exogenous entry of a second carrier in the early U.S. cellular telephone industry. It shows that competition induces firms to introduce mostly non-foggy options, thus abandoning deceptive pricing strategies (fog lifting) aimed to profit from mistaken choices of consumers rather than softening competition through the use of foggy tactics (co-opetition). Results indicate that tariff fogginess is less severe with the entry of a second firm in the industry according to either definition of foggy pricing. Thus competition alone, and in particular the tactics of entrants, appears to correct deceptive pricing strategies, although such correction does not necessarily occur immediately after the entry of a competitor but rather in the long run. Results are robust to the existence of individual uncertainty regarding future telephone usage when consumers sign up for a particular tariff plan.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Co-opetition Fog-lifting Foggy strategies Nonlinear pricing Phasing-out
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6319
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535156
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hyun Song Shin,Viral Acharya,Tanju Yorulmazer. DP6319 Fire-sale FDI. 2007.