| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6341
|
| DP6341 Power in the Multinational Corporation in Industry Equilibrium |
| Dalia Marin; Thierry Verdier
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-15
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper tests whether the behaviour of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces, during which we directly observed over 6,000 illegal payments to traffic police, military officers, and attendants at weigh stations. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of police and military checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments, finding evidence consistent with double-marginalization and hold-up along a chain of vertical monopolies. Furthermore, we document that the illegal nature of these payments does not prevent corrupt officials from extracting additional revenue using complex pricing schemes, including third-degree price discrimination and a menu of two-part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anti-corruption policy. |
| 主题 | Development Economics
|
| 关键词 | Corruption
Double-marginalization
Extortion
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6341
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535171
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dalia Marin,Thierry Verdier. DP6341 Power in the Multinational Corporation in Industry Equilibrium. 2007.
|
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