| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6344 |
| DP6344 Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-Based Monitoring Project in Uganda | |
| Jakob Svensson; Martina Björkman Nyqvist | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-15 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how banks should protect their credit departments against the external influence from potential borrowers. We analyze four mechanisms that are widespread in practice: a credit board with unanimity or simple majority, a hierarchy and an advisory system. A bank faces a trade-off between the quality of information aggregation and the effectiveness of barriers against external influence. We provide a ranking of the different schemes. Some of them are equivalent even though the credit managers' decision power differs. In large credit decisions, banks should sacrifice on the quality of information aggregation in order to better protect the decision making process from outside influence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Hierarchies Lobbying Voting rules |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6344 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535174 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jakob Svensson,Martina Björkman Nyqvist. DP6344 Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-Based Monitoring Project in Uganda. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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