| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6322 |
| DP6322 Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Is competition for donations between development NGOs good for welfare? We address this question in a monopolistic competition model à la Salop (1979). NGOs - defined by the non-distribution constraint - compete for donations from donors by exerting fundraising effort. If the market size is fixed, the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs is usually larger than the optimal number. However, if the market size is endogenous and NGOs both compete and co-operate in attracting new donors, the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs is generally smaller than the optimal number. If NGOs can divert a part of funds for private use, for a certain range of outside option of NGO entrepreneurs multiple equilibria (with high diversion and no diversion of funds) exist. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Ngos Monopolistic competition Non-distribution constraint |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6322 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535191 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP6322 Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information. 2007. |
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