| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6328 |
| DP6328 Consensual and Conflictual Democratization, Rule of Law, and Development | |
| Uwe Sunde; Piergiuseppe Fortunato; Matteo Cervellati | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Should privately informed agents with diverging interests act independently or should they commit to a mechanism? This paper analyzes different communication and decision protocols when communication involves delay. It studies under which conditions agents should (i) choose their actions immediately and non-cooperatively, (ii) communicate and act independently or (iii) contract before receiving their information. Well informed agents with similar preferences do not contract or communicate. Communication is desirable when preferences are similar and individual signals are of intermediate quality. Contracting on a Bayesian mechanism only pays when agents' preferences are not too strongly correlated, when information quality is high, and when the cost of delay is sufficiently low. When the correlation is negative and large enough, the optimal contract does not involve any communication. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Decentralization Eu Mechanism design Protocol design Turkey |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6328 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535197 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Uwe Sunde,Piergiuseppe Fortunato,Matteo Cervellati. DP6328 Consensual and Conflictual Democratization, Rule of Law, and Development. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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