| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6363 |
| DP6363 The Returns from Reducing Corruption: Evidence from Education in Uganda | |
| Jakob Svensson; Ritva Reinikka | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Given symmetric information, in a standard hold-up problem a buyer's investment incentives are always increasing in his bargaining power. While this result is robust under one-sided private information, it can be overturned under two-sided private information. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hold-up problem Incomplete contracts Investment incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6363 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535202 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jakob Svensson,Ritva Reinikka. DP6363 The Returns from Reducing Corruption: Evidence from Education in Uganda. 2007. |
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