G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6369
DP6369 Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees
Justin Wolfers; Joseph Price
发表日期2007-06-29
出版年2007
语种英语
摘要This paper investigates the endogenous emergence of democracy and rule of law in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. Decisions about public policies concern the extent of fiscal redistribution and property rights, whose costs depend on the extent of predation in the population. We characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy in which both the political regimes and public policies are endogenously determined. The theory delivers several novel results. Multiple politico-economic equilibria involving different public policies can be sustained conditional on beliefs about property rights enforcement. Democratization is endogenous, but the features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed under conflictual environments. Conflictual transitions lead to failed democracies with potentially worse property rights protection than oligarchies. The novel predictions are in line with existing evidence and with results from newly collected data on constitutional principles.
主题Development Economics
关键词Commitment Conflict Consensual democracy Constitutional principles Democratization Inequality Oligarchy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6369
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535208
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Justin Wolfers,Joseph Price. DP6369 Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees. 2007.
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