| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6369
|
| DP6369 Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees |
| Justin Wolfers; Joseph Price
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-29
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the endogenous emergence of democracy and rule of law in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. Decisions about public policies concern the extent of fiscal redistribution and property rights, whose costs depend on the extent of predation in the population. We characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy in which both the political regimes and public policies are endogenously determined. The theory delivers several novel results. Multiple politico-economic equilibria involving different public policies can be sustained conditional on beliefs about property rights enforcement. Democratization is endogenous, but the features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed under conflictual environments. Conflictual transitions lead to failed democracies with potentially worse property rights protection than oligarchies. The novel predictions are in line with existing evidence and with results from newly collected data on constitutional principles. |
| 主题 | Development Economics
|
| 关键词 | Commitment
Conflict
Consensual democracy
Constitutional principles
Democratization
Inequality
Oligarchy
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6369
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535208
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Justin Wolfers,Joseph Price. DP6369 Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees. 2007.
|
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