| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6374 |
| DP6374 Institutional Trade Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns | |
| Andrea Prat; Amil Dasgupta; Michela Verardo | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the most effective way to increase primary school enrolment and student learning? We argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption. We examine this hypothesis by exploiting an unusual policy experiment: A newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools (parents) with information to monitor local officials' handling of a large education grant program. Combining survey and administrative data, we show that the campaign was successful, and the reduction in capture of funds had a positive effect on enrolment and student learning. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Education Newspaper campaign |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6374 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535213 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Prat,Amil Dasgupta,Michela Verardo. DP6374 Institutional Trade Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
