| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6381
|
| DP6381 Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption |
| Abhijit Banerjee; Rohini Pande
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-07-06
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The NBA provides an intriguing place to test for taste-based discrimination: referees and players are involved in repeated interactions in a high-pressure setting with referees making the type of split-second decisions that might allow implicit racial biases to manifest themselves. Moreover, the referees receive constant monitoring and feedback on their performance. (Commissioner Stern has claimed that NBA referees ?are the most ranked, rated, reviewed, statistically analyzed and mentored group of employees of any company in any place in the world.?) The essentially arbitrary assignment of refereeing crews to basketball games, and the number of repeated interactions allow us to convincingly test for own-race preferences. We find?even conditioning on player and referee fixed effects (and specific game fixed effects)?that more personal fouls are called against players when they are officiated by an opposite-race refereeing crew than when officiated by an own-race crew. These biases are sufficiently large that we find appreciable differences in whether predominantly black teams are more likely to win or lose, based on the racial composition of the refereeing crew. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Basketball
Discrimination
Evaluation
Implicit discrimination
Own-race bias
Race
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6381
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535219
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Abhijit Banerjee,Rohini Pande. DP6381 Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption. 2007.
|
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