| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6413 |
| DP6413 Footloose Monopolies:Regulating a "National Champion" | |
| Carlo Scarpa; Giacomo Calzolari | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue. A substantially revised version of this paper has been published as CEPR DP7411. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Entry Jump bidding Procurement Sequential sales |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6413 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535251 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Scarpa,Giacomo Calzolari. DP6413 Footloose Monopolies:Regulating a "National Champion". 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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