| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6437 |
| DP6437 Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools | |
| Jo Seldeslachts; Pedro Barros; Joseph A. Clougherty | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-08-24 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. Regions' choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes (Boadway and Flatters, 1982, and Weingast, 2006). We show that tax competition distorts (downwards) public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes. However, the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and, under a low degree of regional asymmetry, also for each region. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Equalization Fiscal Fiscal federalism Heterogeneous regions Public investments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6437 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535274 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jo Seldeslachts,Pedro Barros,Joseph A. Clougherty. DP6437 Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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