| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6475
|
| DP6475 The Limits of Transparency |
| Alex Cukierman
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-09-21
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We present a structural framework for the evaluation of public policies intended to increase job search intensity. Most of the literature defines search intensity as a scalar that influences the arrival rate of job offers; here we treat it as the number of job applications that workers send out. The wage distribution and job search intensities are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. We structurally estimate the search cost distribution, the implied matching probabilities, the productivity of a match, and the flow value of non-labor market time; the estimates are then used to derive the socially optimal distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, too few workers participate in the labor market while some unemployed search too much. The low participation rate reflects a standard hold-up problem and the excess number of applications result is due to rent seeking behavior. Sizable welfare gains (15% to 20%) can be realized by simultaneously opening more vacancies and increasing participation. A modest binding minimum wage or conditioning UI benefits on applying for at least one job per period, increases welfare. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Job search
Labour market frictions
Search costs
Structural estimation
Wage dispersion
Welfare
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6475
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535295
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alex Cukierman. DP6475 The Limits of Transparency. 2007.
|
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