| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6479 |
| DP6479 Multilateral Subsidy Games | |
| Peter Neary; Dermot Leahy | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the optimal schedule of tasks over time and the optimal assignment of tasks to agents conditional on the outcomes of previous tasks. In particular, we show that delaying tasks is optimal if and only if the effect of an agent's effort on the probability of success is relatively low. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hidden actions Job design Limited liability Task assignment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6479 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535298 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Neary,Dermot Leahy. DP6479 Multilateral Subsidy Games. 2007. |
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