| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6458 |
| DP6458 Multilateral Trade Cooperation: What Next? | |
| David Vines | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of bidders' valuations. In contrast, in first-price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be explained by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where bidders anticipate positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing. Even if the "emotional" (dis-)utility is very small, the seller's optimal reserve price r* may be significantly different from the standard model. Moreover, r* is decreasing in the number of bidders. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auction theory Emotions Reserve prices |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6458 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535318 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Vines. DP6458 Multilateral Trade Cooperation: What Next?. 2007. |
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