| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6459 |
| DP6459 Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough | |
| Chad Bown | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the standard property rights approach to the theory of the firm, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single party. This result holds under the assumption that bargaining is always ex post efficient due to symmetric information. However, joint ownership can be optimal if the parties have private information about the payoffs that they can realize on their own. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Investment incentives Joint ownership Property rights |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6459 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535319 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chad Bown. DP6459 Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough. 2007. |
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