G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6500
DP6500 Trade Liberalization, Competition and Growth
Omar Licandro; Antonio Navas-Ruiz
发表日期2007-09-28
出版年2007
语种英语
摘要We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or intrinsically motivated; d) they have limited liability. Four types of separating equilibrium can emerge, depending on the degree of altruism, characterised as very low, low, high and very high. i) For very low altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is distorted upwards and downwards respectively; the efficient type makes a positive profit. ii) For low altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is also distorted respectively upwards and downwards, but profits are zero for both types. iii) For high altruism the first best is attained: no distortions on quantities and zero profits. iv) For very high altruism the quantity of the inefficient type is distorted upwards, and the quantity of the efficient type is distorted either upwards or downwards. The inefficient type might have a positive profit. The quantity of the efficient type is higher than that of the inefficient type in all four possible equilibria. The transfer for the efficient type can be higher or lower than the inefficient one, unless altruism tends to zero in which case the transfer for the efficient type is higher. The utility of the efficient type is higher than that of the inefficient one when altruism is very low, low or high, though not necessarily when altruism is very high.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词altruism Motivated agents Performance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6500
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535339
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Omar Licandro,Antonio Navas-Ruiz. DP6500 Trade Liberalization, Competition and Growth. 2007.
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