| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6515 |
| DP6515 Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives | |
| Pietro Veronesi; Eugene Kandel; Efraim Benmelech | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that international consumption risk sharing is significantly improved by capital flows, especially portfolio investment. Concomitantly, we show that poor institutions hamper risk sharing, but to an extent that decreases with openness. In particular, risk sharing is prevalent even among economies with poor institutions, provided they are open to international markets. This is consistent with the view that the prospect of retaliation may deter expropriation of foreign capital, even in institutional environments where it is possible. This deterrent is anticipated by investors, who act to diversify risk. By contrast, capital flows headed for closed economies with poor institutions are designed and constrained so as to limit the cost incurred in case of expropriation, and thus achieve little risk sharing. We show this non-linearity continues to be present in the determinants of international capital flows themselves. Institutions are crucial in attracting capital for closed economies, but are barely relevant in open ones, with corresponding consequences on the extent of international risk insurance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Cross-border investment Diversification Financial integration Portfolio choice Risk sharing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6515 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535353 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pietro Veronesi,Eugene Kandel,Efraim Benmelech. DP6515 Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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