G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6516
DP6516 Testing Uncovered Interest Parity: A Continuous-Time Approach
ENRIQUE SENTANA; Antonio Diez de los Rios
发表日期2007-10-05
出版年2007
语种英语
摘要In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must reach in order to be reelected. In a simple model, we illustrate the working of vote-share contracts. Such vote-share contracts curb socially detrimental incumbency advantages by improving the average ability level of re-elected politicians and also increase effort. We show that the socially optimal vote-share threshold for incumbents is larger than one half. Competing candidates offer vote-share contracts with socially optimal thresholds.
主题Public Economics
关键词Elections Political contracts Vote-share thresholds
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6516
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535354
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
ENRIQUE SENTANA,Antonio Diez de los Rios. DP6516 Testing Uncovered Interest Parity: A Continuous-Time Approach. 2007.
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