| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6516 |
| DP6516 Testing Uncovered Interest Parity: A Continuous-Time Approach | |
| ENRIQUE SENTANA; Antonio Diez de los Rios | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must reach in order to be reelected. In a simple model, we illustrate the working of vote-share contracts. Such vote-share contracts curb socially detrimental incumbency advantages by improving the average ability level of re-elected politicians and also increase effort. We show that the socially optimal vote-share threshold for incumbents is larger than one half. Competing candidates offer vote-share contracts with socially optimal thresholds. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Political contracts Vote-share thresholds |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6516 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535354 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | ENRIQUE SENTANA,Antonio Diez de los Rios. DP6516 Testing Uncovered Interest Parity: A Continuous-Time Approach. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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