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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP6524 |
DP6524 Growth, Volatility and Political Instability: Non-Linear Time-Series Evidence for Argentina, 1896-2000 | |
Menelaos Karanasos; Nauro Campos | |
发表日期 | 2007-10-12 |
出版年 | 2007 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare, focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations. In a representative-agent model of fiscal federalism, fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax-setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare. If, however, tax-setting authorities pursue revenue maximization, fragmentation, by pushing down equilibrium tax rates, may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare. We exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous Swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects. While for purely direct-democratic jurisdictions (which we associate with benevolent tax setting) we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation, fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government. Our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second-best welfare enhancing by constraining the scope for public-sector revenue maximization. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Direct democracy Fiscal federalism Government preferences Optimal taxation Tax competition |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6524 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535363 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Menelaos Karanasos,Nauro Campos. DP6524 Growth, Volatility and Political Instability: Non-Linear Time-Series Evidence for Argentina, 1896-2000. 2007. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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