| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6527 |
| DP6527 Interactions Between Workers and the Technology of Production: Evidence from Professional Baseball | |
| Eric Gould; Eyal Winter | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-10-12 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information we show that although stock-based compensation causes managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm?s investment opportunities by following largely sub-optimal investment policies. This problem is especially severe for growth firms, whose stock prices then become overvalued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and earnings performance instead induces a combination of high effort, truth revelation and optimal investments. The model produces numerous predictions that are consistent with the empirical evidence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ceo compensation Sub-optimal investments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6527 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535366 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Gould,Eyal Winter. DP6527 Interactions Between Workers and the Technology of Production: Evidence from Professional Baseball. 2007. |
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