| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6555 |
| DP6555 Executive Compensation: The View from General Equilibrium | |
| Jean-Pierre Danthine; John B Donaldson | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-11-09 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In spite of their relative vicinity Scandinavian countries and Central European countries (mainly Germany) have substantially different schooling institutions. While the former group of countries delays school tracking until age 16, the latter group anticipates differentiation between age 10 and age 13. This paper proposes a simple median voter model of school design which accounts rather well for these differences. The key idea is that voters weight the potential advantages of early tracking in terms of higher wages and human capital against the information loss associated to early selection. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | School tracking Scandinavia Central europe |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6555 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535394 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Pierre Danthine,John B Donaldson. DP6555 Executive Compensation: The View from General Equilibrium. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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