| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6577 |
| DP6577 Intertemporal Distortions in the Second Best | |
| Stefania Albanesi; Roc Armenter | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy where risk averse shareholders delegate the management of the firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non-tradable equity position and a variable 'salary' component indexed to the aggregate wage bill and to aggregate dividends. Tying a manager's compensation to the performance of her own firm ensures that her interests are aligned with the goals of firm owners and that maximizing the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensation to overall economic performance is also required to make sure that managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to value those future dividends. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Incentives Optimal contracting Stochastic discount factor |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6577 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535416 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefania Albanesi,Roc Armenter. DP6577 Intertemporal Distortions in the Second Best. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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