全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6603 Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6603
	DP6603 Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries
	Irina Denisova; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya; Timothy Frye; Markus Eller
发表日期	2007-12-14
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players? strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players? objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.
主题	International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词	Bargaining Non-cooperative game theory Uncertainty Simulation models
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6603
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535434
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Irina Denisova,Ekaterina Zhuravskaya,Timothy Frye,et al. DP6603 Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries. 2007.