G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6630
DP6630 Moral Hazard, Collateral and Liquidity
Viral Acharya; S. Viswanathan
发表日期2008-01-11
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereign debt crises. The king failed to honour his debts four times during his reign. In this paper, we reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Spain. New archival evidence allows us to derive comprehensive estimates of debt and revenue. These show that primary surpluses were sufficient to make the king's debt sustainable for most of his reign. Spain's debt burden was manageable up to the 1580s, and its fiscal position only deteriorated for good after the defeat of the "Invincible Armada". We also estimate fiscal policy reaction functions, and show that Spain under the Habsburgs was at least as "responsible" as the US in the 20th century or as Britain in the 18th century. Our results suggest that the outcome of uncertain events such as wars may have more influence on a history of default than strict adherence to fiscal rules.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Early modern history Fiscal stability Natural resources Sovereign debt Spain Sustainability
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6630
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535464
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Viral Acharya,S. Viswanathan. DP6630 Moral Hazard, Collateral and Liquidity. 2008.
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