全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6660 Varieties and the Transfer Problem: the Extensive Margin of Current Account Adjustment

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6660
	DP6660 Varieties and the Transfer Problem: the Extensive Margin of Current Account Adjustment
	Paolo Pesenti; Philippe Martin; Giancarlo Corsetti
发表日期	2008-01-25
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding into the spot market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price-caps and (iii) bid duration. We find that, although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices, this does not imply that investment incentives at the margin are poorer; indeed, under reasonable assumptions on the shape of the demand distribution, the discriminatory auction induces (weakly) stronger investment incentives than the uniform-price format.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Market design Uniform price and discriminatory auctions investment Electricity Regulatory reform
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6660
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535498
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Paolo Pesenti,Philippe Martin,Giancarlo Corsetti. DP6660 Varieties and the Transfer Problem: the Extensive Margin of Current Account Adjustment. 2008.