全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6661 Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6661
	DP6661 Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence
	Bruno Jullien; Thierry Magnac; Pierre Dubois
发表日期	2008-01-25
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than they would otherwise, due to competition in the managerial labour market. This externality reduces the value to firms of investing in corporate governance and produces weaker overall governance in the economy. The effect is stronger the greater the competition for managers and the stronger the managerial bargaining power. While standards can help raise governance towards efficient levels, market-based mechanisms such as (i) the acquisition of large equity stakes by raiders and (ii) the need to raise external capital by firms can help too, and we characterize conditions under which this happens.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Corporate governance Executive compensation Externality Governance standards Ownership structure Regulation
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6661
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535499
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Bruno Jullien,Thierry Magnac,Pierre Dubois. DP6661 Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence. 2008.