| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6664
|
| DP6664 Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device |
| Volker Nocke; Martin Peitz
|
| 发表日期 | 2008-01-25
|
| 出版年 | 2008
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We model cooperation between an employer and a workers' union as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game with discounting and imperfect monitoring. The employer has private information about firm profitability. The model explains the incidence and duration of strikes, as well as the employer's outsourcing (or partial lock-out) decisions. By means of an effort variable, it also extends the theory to account for worker resistance phenomena, taking the form of low effort on the part of employees. Strikes appear as random equilibrium phenomena, during finite-duration, but recurrent phases of play, triggered by the occurrence of a low-profitability state. We show that high-effort and high-pay cooperative agreements between the union and the employer can be supported as perfect public equilibria of the repeated game, if players are patient enough, but only at the cost of random reversions to noncooperative equilibrium in which strikes, low effort, low pay, and outsourcing take place. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
; Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Imperfect monitoring
Industrial relations
Mechanism design
Public employment
Repeated games
Theory of strikes
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6664
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535501
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Volker Nocke,Martin Peitz. DP6664 Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device. 2008.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
