全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6670 Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6670
	DP6670 Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment
	Hessel Oosterbeek; Bas van der Klaauw; Edwin Leuven; Joep Sonnemans
发表日期	2008-01-25
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from experiments in laboratories and non-experimental studies exploiting sports or firm data. Selection of competitors across tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external validity of results obtained in lab experiments or from sports data. To address these concerns we conducted a field experiment where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing student on the final exam of a standard introductory microeconomics course could win a substantial financial reward. A standard non-experimental analysis exploiting across tournament variation in reward size and competitiveness confirms earlier findings. We find however no evidence for effects of tournament participation on study effort and exam results when we exploit our experimental design, indicating that the non-experimental results are completely due to sorting. Treatment only affects attendance of the first workgroup meeting following the announcement of treatment status, suggesting a difference between short-run and long-run decision making.
主题	Labour Economics
关键词	Field experiments Incentives Sorting Tournaments
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6670
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535507
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hessel Oosterbeek,Bas van der Klaauw,Edwin Leuven,et al. DP6670 Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2008.