| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6683 |
| DP6683 Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence From The Subprime Mortgage Market | |
| Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Luc Laeven | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations). |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Carrot/stick High stakes Rewards Punishment Economics of religion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6683 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535520 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Dell'Ariccia,Luc Laeven. DP6683 Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence From The Subprime Mortgage Market. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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