| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6695 |
| DP6695 One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation | |
| Micael Castanheira; Laurent Bouton | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-07 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a two-period model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal's initial utility is higher under transparency, because members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general, committee members are harmed by transparency. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Career concerns Committees Experts Information acquisition transparency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6695 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535532 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Micael Castanheira,Laurent Bouton. DP6695 One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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