| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6703 |
| DP6703 Love and Taxes - and Matching Institutions | |
| Kjell Erik Lommerud; Kai Konrad | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks. Consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate. Firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices (which may be below cost). New consumers have a privately known preference for each network. Upon joining a network, in each period consumers enjoy a benefit which is increasing in network size during that period. Firms receive revenues from new consumers as well as from consumers already belonging to their network. Using a combination of analytical and numerical methods, I discuss various properties of the equilibrium. I show that very small or very large networks tend to price higher than networks of intermediate size. I also show that, around symmetric states, the gap between the large and the small network tends to widen (increasing dominance) whereas the opposite is true (reversion to the mean) around very asymmetric states. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic price competition Network effects |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6703 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535539 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kjell Erik Lommerud,Kai Konrad. DP6703 Love and Taxes - and Matching Institutions. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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