| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6705
|
| DP6705 International Capital Flows |
| Eric van Wincoop; Cedric Tille
|
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-15
|
| 出版年 | 2008
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services. We assume that providers can increase demand by increasing quality but can also inflate activity through a manipulative effort (upcoding or DRG creep). We derive and compare the optimal price and audit policy for the purchaser under two scenarios: a) the purchaser can commit to a given audit policy (commitment); b) the purchaser cannot commit to a given audit policy (no commitment). If reported output is additive in quality and manipulation, we find that, if price is exogenously determined, the frequency of an audit is higher under the 'commitment' scenario than under the 'no commitment' one; also, under 'commitment', the degree of manipulation, quality and reported output are higher. If price is endogenous (i.e. it can be optimally chosen by the purchaser), then price is higher under 'no commitment' while the optimal audit policy, the equilibrium quality, manipulation and purchaser's net benefit are identical. If reported output is multiplicative in manipulation and quality, the purchaser sets a higher price under 'no commitment'. Nevertheless, quality and manipulation remain at lower levels, whereas auditing is more intensive than under commitment. The inability to commit now reduces the purchaser's net benefit. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Drg creep
Falsification
Hospitals
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6705
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535541
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Eric van Wincoop,Cedric Tille. DP6705 International Capital Flows. 2008.
|
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