| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6711 |
| DP6711 Job Search Monitoring and Unemployment Duration: Evidence from a Randomised Control Trial | |
| John Micklewright; Gyula Nagy | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper compares the properties of three electoral systems when voters have imperfect information. Imperfect information blurs voter decisions and may divorce the electoral outcome from the true preferences of the electorate. The challenge for electoral design is therefore to translate the (sometimes contradictory) elements of information dispersed in the electorate into the most efficient aggregate outcome. We propose a novel model of multi-candidate elections in Poisson games, and show that Approval Voting produces a unique equilibrium that is fully efficient: the candidate who wins the election is the one preferred by a majority of the electorate under full information. By contrast, traditional systems such as Plurality and Runoff elections cannot cope satisfactorily with information imperfections. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Approval voting Information aggregation Multicandidate elections Poisson games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6711 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535547 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Micklewright,Gyula Nagy. DP6711 Job Search Monitoring and Unemployment Duration: Evidence from a Randomised Control Trial. 2008. |
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