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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP6713 |
DP6713 Supermarkets and Planning Regulation | |
Rachel Griffith; Heike Harmgart | |
发表日期 | 2008-02-15 |
出版年 | 2008 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are associated with a greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying mergers, and this propensity changes in response to changes in the country creditor rights. Also, in countries with stronger creditor rights companies? operating risk is lower, and acquirers with low-recovery assets prefer targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization, suggesting an agency-cost effect. Our results suggest that there might be a "dark" side to strong creditor rights in that they can induce costly risk avoidance in corporate policies. Thus, stronger creditor rights may not necessarily be optimal. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Bankruptcy Default Diversification Managerial turnover Recovery |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6713 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535549 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rachel Griffith,Heike Harmgart. DP6713 Supermarkets and Planning Regulation. 2008. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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