G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP6713
DP6713 Supermarkets and Planning Regulation
Rachel Griffith; Heike Harmgart
发表日期2008-02-15
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are associated with a greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying mergers, and this propensity changes in response to changes in the country creditor rights. Also, in countries with stronger creditor rights companies? operating risk is lower, and acquirers with low-recovery assets prefer targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization, suggesting an agency-cost effect. Our results suggest that there might be a "dark" side to strong creditor rights in that they can induce costly risk avoidance in corporate policies. Thus, stronger creditor rights may not necessarily be optimal.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Bankruptcy Default Diversification Managerial turnover Recovery
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp6713
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535549
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rachel Griffith,Heike Harmgart. DP6713 Supermarkets and Planning Regulation. 2008.
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