| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6729 |
| DP6729 Illusory Revenues: Tariffs in Resource-Rich and Aid-Rich Economies | |
| Anthony Venables; Paul Collier | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family. Everyone prefers a partner that has a high income and is a perfect emotional match, but compromises must often be struck. A high-income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally, because he may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by marriage. Redistributive income taxation may ease this problem. Income matching institutions that secure that people from the same income groups largely meet each other can substitute for redistribution, so that optimal redistribution is reduced. We also introduce a divorce option. Redistributive taxation is shown both to further and stabilize marriage. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Assortative mating Divorce Emotional rents Incomplete contracts Love Marriage Optimal taxation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6729 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535566 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony Venables,Paul Collier. DP6729 Illusory Revenues: Tariffs in Resource-Rich and Aid-Rich Economies. 2008. |
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