| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6721 |
| DP6721 Home Bias at the Fund Level | |
| Helene Rey; Harald Hau | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the principal can make an investment and the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that effort is higher after a success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified." |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic moral hazard Hidden actions Limited liability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6721 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535568 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helene Rey,Harald Hau. DP6721 Home Bias at the Fund Level. 2008. |
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