| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6751 |
| DP6751 Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions and the Great Divergence | |
| Oded Galor; Omer Moav; Dietrich Vollrath | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study hiring decisions made by competing universities in a dynamic framework, focusing on the structure of university finance. Universities with annual state-approved financing underinvest in high-quality faculty, while universities that receive a significant part of their annual income from returns on endowments hire fewer but better faculty and provide long-term contracts. If university financing is linked to the number of students, there is additional pressure to hire low-quality short-term staff. An increase in the university's budget might force the university to switch its priorities from `research' to `teaching' in equilibrium. We employ our model to discuss the necessity for state-financed endowments, and investigate the political economics of competition between universities, path-dependence in the development of the university system, and higher-education reform in emerging market economies. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Dynamic game Economics of education Tenure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6751 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535587 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oded Galor,Omer Moav,Dietrich Vollrath. DP6751 Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions and the Great Divergence. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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